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Resumen
Abstract
Las éticas animales se encuentran en una nueva fase del desarrollo del pensamiento ético animal. Los 
temas y problemas que antes se barajaban principalmente en términos de teorías, conceptos y pa-
radigmas éticos están siendo reformulados en perspectivas y acercamientos propios de la teoría y la 
acción políticas. Se trata de la transición de una visión de la ética como una disciplina centrada en las 
relaciones entre individuos (humanos y animales) a otra que añade una dimensión social y política 
de las relaciones entre las comunidades humanas y los animales no humanos. En ella, éstos ya no son 
vistos sólo como un colectivo heterogéneo de seres vivos (sintientes o conscientes) o como especies, 
sino como parte de un bien común que es al mismo tiempo humano y animal. Para poder participar 
de esta nueva fase e incorporar la discusión de esta temática, la bioética debe afrontar una serie de 
problemas que han dificultado la integración de las éticas animales en su seno. Para ello es necesario 
el desarrollo de un nuevo marco de análisis relacional y comunitario, capaz de poner de manifiesto la 
dimensión política de los problemas que surgen de las relaciones entre las comunidades humanas, 
los animales no humanos y el ecosistema.
Animal ethics has reached a new phase with the development of animal ethical thinking. Topics and 
problems previously discussed in terms of moral theories and ethical concepts are now being refor-
mulated in terms of political theory and political action. This constitutes a paradigm shift for Animal 
Ethics. It indicates the transition from a field focused on relations between individuals (humans and 
animals) to a new viewpoint that incorporates the political dimensions of the relationships between 
human communities and non-human animals. Animals are no longer seen as a heterogeneous group 
of sentient beings or simply as species, but as part of a common good that is simultaneously human 
and animal. In order to participate in this new phase, bioethics will have to face a series of challenges 
that have hindered the integration of animal ethics within its field. It will also need the development of 
a new theoretical framework based on relations between communities of individuals. This framework 
will be able to highlight the ethical and political dimensions that arise from interactions between 
human communities, non-human animals and the ecosystem.
Animal Ethics, non-human animals, human comunities.
Ética animal, animales no humanos, comunidades humanas.
Recibido: 13/3/2016. Aceptado: 27/3/2016.Fechas
Keywords
Revista Iberoamericana de Bioética / nº 01 / 01-13 [2016] [ISSN 000-000]  3
1. A brief outline of animal ethics and its political dimension
If someone were to ask us what is our relationship with animals, we would probably 
reply that we like them, that they amuse us or even that we love them. Yet, as a society, 
that line of argument is difficult to maintain. Human communities routinely exploit bil-
lions of nonhuman animals in a vast network of profit. We killed them to make coats and 
wallets or for meat to overfeed us; we kill them even for fun and then we call that sport. 
Some of them are used in scientific experiments in which the line between research and 
suffering is so thin that in some cases it makes it tantamount to torture. 
However, some uses of animals are vital to human communities. Animal research is 
considered the pillar of biological science. We depend on it for the development of new 
vaccines, for the study of zoonotic diseases and for countless medical applications for 
our health. 
This dichotomy between moral conscience and cost-benefit 
raises two key questions: what kind of relations do we have with 
other animals and what kind of relations should we have. The 
field of animal ethics was created to deal with these issues.
Animal ethics is a broad field. From a practical perspective, it 
evaluates the moral legitimacy and the ways in which human 
communities exploit other animals for their benefit. It covers top-
ics such as the breeding and mass slaughter of animals for hu-
man consumption, the environmental impact of animal farming; 
hunting and blood sports or the use of animals for entertainment 
and for biomedical research. It also deals with questions related 
to the protection of endangered species, the impact of human 
activities on wild habitats and its effects on the environment. Un-
like environmental ethics, which also addresses some of these 
issues, the focus of animal ethics is not species or ecosystems, but the wellbeing of 
animals as individuals and as communities.
Although moral reasoning about animals can be traced back more than two thousand 
years in the Oriental and Western traditions, the contemporary discussion of animal 
ethics emerged during the 1970’s in the U.S. Since then, the debate has evolved through 
various phases or stages. They could be categorized by their emphasis on a series 
of topics and approaches that have generated a wide range of works or profoundly 
influenced the field. Viewed this way, the development of animal ethics can be roughly 
divided into three overlapping, but clearly distinguishable junctures: a theoretical phase, 
a pragmatic phase and a political phase. 
The first phase is characterized by a strong focus on ethical theory and on the founda-
tions of moral action, hence the name theoretical. The most influential approaches at 
this stage were Peter Singer’s utilitarianism and Tom Regan’s deontology. Singer (1975) 
emphasized animal suffering and based its approach on the principle of “equal conside-
ration of interests” for all sentient beings. Meanwhile, Regan (1983) focused on animal 
dignity and defended animal rights based on the notion of a “ subject of a life”. Whi-
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le much of the philosophical debate centered around the works of these two authors, 
other approaches were also discussed (e.g. ecological holism, care-ethics, empathy, 
etc). Concepts such as moral status, interests, rights, animal welfare and compassion 
became the canonical vocabulary of the field. Although this trend dominated much of 
the debate of animal ethics since the 1970’s, its intensity has very much diminished in 
the last decades. 
By the 1990’s animal activism had very much distanced itself from previous academic 
debates. Its interests have shifted from theoretical discussions to practical matters 
such as public policy and animals. This phase can be characterized as pragmatic be-
cause it involves the taking of a practical stance within a wide spectrum of theoretical 
approaches. What differs from the preceding phase is that, regardless of theoretical 
frameworks, each author is expected to answer a strategic question: what is the goal 
they want to achieve and what kind of change is needed in order to achieve it. All of 
them favor the establishment of legal protections for non-human animals, what differs 
is the level of ideological or practical commitment involved in it. In opposite sides of the 
spectrum we find a polarization between two competing approaches: abolitionism and 
welfarism.
Welfarism endorses the progressive reform of existing animal 
protection laws. Its objective is to extend the moral and legal pro-
tections to non-human animals and change the animal welfare 
laws without radically altering the status quo. Meanwhile, aboli-
tionism rejects the strategy of gradual reform and believes that 
the whole system of animal welfare is flawed because it treats 
non-human animals as property. In its place, it defends the abo-
lition of all exploitative practices against non-human animals. 
This entails granting legal personhood to non-human animals 
and the transformation of society towards a vegan lifestyle. It 
also implies a series of radical changes at the legal, economic, 
socio-political and cultural levels. The debate between abolition-
ism and welfarism constitutes a tentative first step from theory to praxis and foreshad-
ows the transition from ethics to politics in animal ethics. 
Currently, we find ourselves is in a new phase, which can be properly called political. 
Topics and problems previously discussed in terms of moral theories and ethical con-
cepts are now being reformulated in terms of political theory and political action. Some 
authors have coined the term “political turn” in order to describe this new phase of ani-
mal ethics (Milligan, 2015). However, this description is inaccurate.1 On the one hand, it 
is never clear who started this “turn” or when. For some authors, it can be found in the 
works of Martha Nussbaum (2006), for others, in the contributions of Robert Garner 
and Alasdair Cochrane (Cochrane, 2010; Garner, 2005, 2013). On the other hand, there is 
1 The term “political turn” appears to be the result of a very common tradition in Anglo-American philosophy, in which the term “turn” is 
often used as an stylistic device that describes all kind of new academic phenomena and trends. Some of these phenomena turn out 
to be real paradigmatic changes, while others end up being just fashions.
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ample evidence that the political dimension of animal ethics was already present in the 
writings of seminal authors in the field like Peter Singer and Tom Regan (Tirado, 2016). 
A more detailed study of the development of moral reasoning about animals demon-
strates that the political dimension was very much present since its beginnings more 
than 2,000 years ago. From its origins in eastern and western antiquity until today, all 
approaches on this subject have always been discussed within the framework of a larg-
er question: what kind of relations should human communities have with non-human 
animals. The answer to this question includes both ethical and political dimensions. 
Hence, instead of talking about a ‘turn’, we should rather speak of a ‘return’. It is the re-
appearance of an age-old discussion about a problem that has always been ethical and 
political at the same time (Tirado, 2016). 
What this new phase illustrates is the transition from a one-to-
one ethical viewpoint to a relational and communitarian vision of 
ethics. Animals are no longer seen as a heterogeneous group of 
sentient beings or simply as species, but as part of a common 
good that is simultaneously human and animal. The beginnings 
of this viewpoint can be found in the contributions of Martha 
Nussbaum (2006), but it takes its current form, mainly, with the 
works of Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011). 
Nussbaum recognizes that the general public confuses most of 
the debate in animal ethics, as well as the political discussion on 
animal protection laws, with the issue of animal cruelty. For most 
of them, cruelty and compassion are two sides of the same coin. 
A person is compassionate when he or she is not cruel or indif-
ferent to the suffering of other beings. However, cruelty is merely 
the component that adds maleficence to the equation of inten-
tional harm. Neither the condemnation of cruelty to animals nor compassion is enough 
to do justice to beings from other species that are treated abusively or undeservingly. 
What non-human animals need is justice. Nussbaum believes that utilitarianism and 
social contract theories cannot achieve this. Instead, she develops her own version of 
the capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 2006) in order to include animals in the sphere 
of justice. 
Nussbaum is one of the first authors to realize that we need to develop a political frame-
work in order to include the variety of our morally relevant interactions with other ani-
mals. After Nussbaum, a series of political frameworks have been proposed in order to 
integrate non-human animals within a political theory. These include Robert Garner’s A 
Theory of Justice for Animals (2013), Kymberly Smith’s Governing Animals (2012) and, 
above all, the political proposal of Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka in Zoopolis (2011). 
From all of them, Zoopolis stands out as the book that has caused the greatest impact 
in the field of animal ethics in recent years. 
Donaldson and Kymlicka propose a new political framework in which they synthesize 
human and animal rights with sovereign and civil rights. All of them are encompassed 
under the fundamental principles of national and international justice. In order to eluci-
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date our relations with nonhuman animals, the authors use three broad categories of 
animals, classified by their relation with human communities: domestic, wild and liminal 
animals. To guide our ethical and political decisions towards them, they apply three 
concepts of liberal political theory to each category of animals, namely: citizenship, 
sovereignty and denizenship. Donaldson and Kymlicka use this framework to clarify the 
protections and safeguards that must be implemented if we want to base our relations 
with other animals on liberal principles.2 
One of the virtues of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s analysis is that it 
shows the limitations of an approach focused on the moral sta-
tus of animals. If we focus on the rights or interests of non-hu-
man animals based on their sentience, consciousness or other 
capabilities such as empathy; we make the mistake of forgetting 
that many of their problems can not be solved from an individual 
point of view. For example, in the case of wild animals, the proper 
question is not what are our moral obligations towards non-hu-
man animals. Rather, it should be: what kind of relations should 
there be between human communities and wild animal communi-
ties within a framework of justice. This will determine our moral 
and political obligations, not to each individual animal, but to the 
whole of their communities. 
Regardless of the evaluation of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s pro-
posal, the merit of Zoopolis is that their analysis practically cov-
ers all relations between nonhuman animals and human com-
munities. This includes their ethical, political and ecological 
dimensions. The key to the success of Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
approach is to focus on communities and not just individuals. This allows them to ad-
dress issues that could not have been solved from the classical approaches of animal 
and environmental ethics. These and other virtues make of Zoopolis a step in the right 
direction to address the complex problems that occur between human communities 
and non-human animals. 
2. Animal ethics in the context of bioethics: a problematic affair
Although animal ethics is nowadays considered a sub-discipline of bioethics, at the 
beginning it did not deal with those topics. The only part of bioethics that dealt with non-
human animals was focused in the treatment of animals used for research. Bioethics 
was seen as a field of practical philosophy dedicated to the moral debate of biomedical 
issues related to humans. This narrow vision of bioethics is still prevalent in many aca-
demic circles. It is the result of the identification of bioethics with only one of its areas: 
biomedical ethics and its applications to the field of health sciences. 
2 Some of them are classical liberal values, such as liberty, equality and justice. However, their model also includes solidarity as a poli-
tical value, as well as the respect for other forms of life and the environment.
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This trend can still be seen in the definition of bioethics used in most textbooks. For 
example, in the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Warren Thomas Reich 
defines bioethics as: 
… the systematic study of the moral dimensions – including moral vision, deci-
sions, conduct, and policies – of the life sciences and health care, employing a 
variety of ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting. (Reich, 1995)
Although Reich mentions the moral dimensions of the life sciences, he immediately 
adds a reference to health care. This is one of the reasons why, despite Reich’s broad 
characterization of the field, bioethics has been usually interpreted in a less broad man-
ner. Most bioethicists understand Reich’s definition as the study 
of the moral dimensions of the life sciences and health care, but 
only to the extent that they affect the wellbeing of humans. Un-
der this interpretation, non-human animals play a very small part 
in it, if negligible. To understand this trend we must go back to 
the origins of modern bioethics. 
The traditional account of bioethics traces its origins to the last 
decades of the twentieth century in the U.S. It also portrays the 
dual origin of the discipline as being conceived by two fathers: 
the American biochemist Van Rensselaer Potter (1911-2001) 
and the Dutch obstetrician André Hellegers (1926-1979). From 
this perspective, there would be two foundational trends in bio-
ethics, an ecological and a biomedical one. Still, none of them is able to encompass the 
field of animal ethics. 
The ecological trend of Bioethics is the result of Van Rensselaer Potter, who used the 
term for the first time in the United States between 1970-1971 and enshrined it in his 
book Bioethics: Bridge to the Future (1971). His perspective on bioethics reflects a 
growing concern for the future of humanity amidst the progress of technology and the 
ecological crisis. Potter talks about the necessity of a discipline that takes into consid-
eration the interactions between the life sciences and the humanities from a global per-
spective. Bioethics would be a new discipline that examines technology and scientific 
progress from an ethical point of view. Potter called it “The science of survival” (1970) 
and visualized it as “a bridge” between the values of the humanities and the facts of sci-
ence whose aim was to ensure the survival of humans on earth. Within it, he proposed 
to develop a land ethics; a wildlife ethics; a population ethics and the moral aspects of 
the use of natural resources (consumption ethics). As it can be seen, Potter’s bioethics 
is concerned with the survival of one species on Earth. All other species and the eco-
system are considered only insofar as they promote this objective. 
The biomedical trend is the result of Hellegers’ vision. His legacy consists of introduc-
ing of the usage of the term in the academia and, indirectly, in public administration and 
mass media. As founder of the first academic center dedicated to the study of bioethics 
(the Kennedy Institute of Ethics), his efforts helped to institutionalize the new discipline. 
Unlike Potter, Hellegers saw bioethics as a continuation of the western philosophical tra-
As it can be seen, Potter’s 
bioethics is concerned with 
the survival of one species on 
Earth. All other species and the 
ecosystem are considered only 
insofar as they promote this 
objective.
Revista Iberoamericana de Bioética / nº 01 / 01-13 [2016] [ISSN 000-000]  8
dition and not as a new discipline that required a paradigm shift. Bioethics would be an 
extension of practical ethics applied to the field of biomedicine. There were new topics 
and problems, but their analysis, concepts and terminology could easily be framed within 
western traditional philosophy. Part of its success was that it dealt with issues of great 
contemporary interest, such as the doctor-patient relation, the ethics of research with 
human subjects, procured abortion and ethical issues at the end of life. Besides the rel-
evance of the issues, its success was due in no small part to the institutional and financial 
support of the Kennedy Foundation, strategically located in the capital of the U.S. Thus, 
Hellegers’ view of bioethics became the standard version in the academic field. 
The prevailing trend in bioethics has been, without a doubt, hellegerian and biomedical. 
This is the branch that produces the largest number of publications, research, and dis-
cussion forums. Potter concerns have not disappeared. They have been integrated into 
the discussion of environmental ethics. Despite the strong influence of Hellegers’ view, 
bioethics has reclaimed significant aspects of both tendencies. 
Both environmental and biomedical ethics are more or less well 
integrated in the field. The incorporation of animal ethics, how-
ever, is a whole different story. 
Not all authors have seen its integration in the field of bioethics 
in the same way. For many decades the publications in these ar-
eas have remained separated. In practice, they function as sepa-
rate disciplines that are developed in parallel fashion and interact 
in a weakly manner. Most journals and textbooks in bioethics in-
clude animal ethics as a relatively minor topic regarding the use 
of animals in research. This leaves out most of the problems that 
occupy the bulk of the debates in animal ethics. Its topics are 
usually presented in a very limited way, as if they were somewhat outside the scope of 
the field. Although there are some exceptions, bioethics remains primarily focused on 
ethical issues related to the area of human health.3
The main subject matters of animal ethics have been incorporated in the field only 
slowly and belatedly. This outcome is not surprising. Having seeing the official story of 
the development of bioethics, it rather gives the impression that this is the result of a 
natural process. The fact that animal ethics has been integrated gradually and belatedly 
seems to be a logical and expected result of the development of bioethics, for such 
concern did not exist at the origin of the discipline. However this would be an incorrect 
analysis, since the notion of bioethics and its term, “Bioethik”, was originally intended 
3 Some notable exceptions include The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Freyy. (2011) and the 
last editions of the Encyclopedia of Bioethics. These anthologies include many of the topics regularly discussed within animal ethics. 
However, they all suffer from various problems of integration. For example, Beauchamp’s anthology does not intend to incorporate ani-
mal ethics within bioethics or to subsume it as a sub-discipline of the field. Animal ethics is rather viewed as a distinct area of applied 
ethics. On the other hand, the latest editions of the Encyclopedia of Bioethics do include animal ethics within bioethics. However, the 
comprehensive scope of the Encyclopedias reveals a lack of consistency in the treatment of the issues. The only attempt to remedy 
this problem consists of complementing the classic category of Animal Research with the broad category of Animal Welfare & Rights. 
While the editors’ effort to encompass the major contemporary issues of animal ethics is remarkable, there is no equivalent effort to 
provide them with a systematic unity, beyond trying to unite the main categories of animal ethics with the common adjective animal.
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to include, among other things, the ethical study of the relations between human beings 
and non-human animals. 
We could talk about a triple origin of bioethics if, instead of the two fathers of the official 
story we add a third who is even older and more relevant to our subject than Potter and 
Hellegers. We are talking about the German philosopher Fritz Jahr (1895-1953). Jahr, 
has the merit, not just of being the first person to use the term ‘bioethics’, but also to 
be the first to envision its current areas of application. He had 
already realized that the different moral problems identified over 
millennia by the Western tradition and its subsequent moral du-
ties could be analyzed from a broader ethical point of view. 
Fritz Jahr was a theologian and philosopher who served for most 
of his life as a pastor and schoolteacher in the German town of 
Halle. Between 1924 and 1948, Jahr published a series of essays 
in which he proposed a new discipline that could integrate the 
facts of the biological sciences with ethics. He called this new 
discipline Bioethik. At his time, a new worldview was emerging. 
It was the result of the realization of the biological unity among 
all living beings (revealed by the theory of evolution) combined 
with the discoveries of the sciences of animal cognition. Having 
contemplated this, Jahr reasoned that it was time for ethics to 
extend its reach beyond the human realm. To unify this world-
view, Jahr proposed a new ethical principle, which he called the 
biological imperative. It was modeled on Kant’s categorical im-
perative, but he modified it to in order to incorporate a new worldview that included ani-
mals in the realm of ethics. It reads: “Respect every living being and treat it, in principle, 
as an end in itself, whenever this may be possible” (Jahr, 1926, p. 604).4
In these essays, Jahr presents a vision of bioethics that subsumes the three dimen-
sions of contemporary bioethics: ecological, biomedical and animalistic. Jahr envi-
sioned bioethics both as science and as wisdom. On the one hand, it is a framework 
in which to analyze and discuss the moral problems that arise from the interactions 
among interdependent living beings. On the other, it is a wisdom that promotes respect 
for other forms of life and makes explicit the moral obligations that stem from it. Jahr’s 
biological imperative applies to each of the areas in which life develops. It covers the 
study of life in the biological sciences as well as the different relations that we maintain 
with various forms of life. 
From a normative perspective, bioethics examines and promotes a series of ethical 
obligations of various kinds that differ according to which life form they are applied. For 
example, reciprocal obligations arise only in the context of full moral agents (e.g. adult 
beings capable of full moral autonomy). These are the typical relations of reciprocity, 
traditionally studied and discussed in moral theory. However, Jahr widens the scope of 
4 “Achte jedes Lebewesen grundsätzlich als einen Selbstzweck, und behandle es nach Möglichkeit als solchen!” (Translation mine). See 
Jahr, Fritz, “ Wissenschaft vom Leben und Sittenlehre “, 1926 , p. 604. Reprinted in Jahr, F., & May, A. (2013)
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ethics in order to address the relations between full moral agents and other beings who 
can not be full moral agents. In todays terminology we will call them “moral patients”. 
Towards these beings there are moral obligations of responsibility and care. 
For example, mentally incapacitated humans and children are too fragile or too weak to 
fend for themselves. They do, however, have moral rights that must be respected and 
guaranteed by full moral agents. Following this line of reasoning, Jahr considers that 
there are also direct duties to other species, in particular to non-human animals. These 
should also be included within the scope of moral consideration. 
After all, they are moral patients too. The fact that they can not 
fully exercise the powers that would allow them to enter in mu-
tual relations of rights and obligations does not mean that we do 
not have direct moral duties towards them.
The extension process also includes other forms of life that 
must be protected for these and for other reasons. Jahr is talking 
about those animal species that are part of the ecosystem. There 
are also moral duties and responsibilities towards them, not only 
as individuals but also as species. He suggests that there should 
be moral duties towards the environment. This includes not only 
the flora and fauna, but also those parts of the ecosystem that 
are not alive, but that enable the lives of thousands of species 
and ourselves. Jahr talks about the conservation of natural environments, the protec-
tion of those spaces that might serve as future habitats and the protection of the Earth 
as a home. 
Jahr’s moral philosophy traces the outlines of what we might call a biospheric ethics 
that is divided into concentric spheres of interaction. At its core lies human ethics. It, 
in turn, extends its scope to include other animals, the environment and, ultimately, the 
rest of the biosphere. Jahr’s view of bioethics includes all forms of life, as well as the 
conditions for the possibility and prosperity of life itself. As we have seen, Jahr identi-
fies each dimension of contemporary bioethics: biomedical, environmental and animal-
istic. It also reflects the main concerns that define each sub-discipline. 
Despite Jahr’s visionary notion of bioethics, one of the weaknesses of his approach 
is that he still views ethical problems within the narrow framework of moral relations 
among individuals (e.g. the relation between “moral agents” and “moral patients”). 
While Jahr believes that the environment and even entire species should be taken into 
account for moral consideration, there is no framework for the transition from individu-
als to communities of individuals. Moral obligations are determined according to which 
object or life form they are directed, but their starting point is always the individual. 
Such individuals can be full moral agents, moral patients or the set of all of them. But 
they are regarded as an abstract collective, not as a community or a society. There is 
no room for the analysis of the moral problems that arise in the context of politically 
organized and self-governing communities. As have seen, this deficiency is particularly 
important in light of the current state of the debate in animal ethics. This raises particu-
lar challenges in order to integrate animal ethics within the realm of bioethics. 
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3. Problems of integration and future challenges
What we are witnessing in animal ethics is nothing less that a paradigm shift that sig-
nals the transition from a field focused on the relations between individuals (humans 
and animals) to a new viewpoint that incorporates the political dimensions of the rela-
tions between human communities and non-human animals. Animals are no longer 
seen as a heterogeneous group of sentient beings or merely as species, but as part of 
a common good that is simultaneously human and animal. In order to participate in 
this new phase, Bioethics will have to face a series of challenges that have hindered the 
integration of animal ethics within its field. 
The first challenge of Bioethics is the integration of its various 
sub-disciplines in a more coherent way. The standard definition 
of Warren Thomas Reich is wide, but very imprecise. It also tends 
to be interpreted in a very restrictive way in which biomedical 
ethics is identified as the whole field. Bioethics needs to recog-
nize that its current scope and extension goes far beyond human 
health and the life sciences. A more articulate definition of bio-
ethics is necessary in order to properly and accurately describe 
its main areas.    Fritz Jahr’s view of bioethics might be appro-
priate for this purpose. It covers much of the topics discussed 
in animal ethics and environmental ethics, as well as the moral 
interactions among humans.   However, an integration of his sort 
would incorporate those areas in an incomplete manner. In the case of animal ethics, 
for example, it could not account for its current transition from ethics to politics, a trend 
that can also be observed in other areas of applied philosophy.5 In order to achieve 
that, bioethics would need more than a simple fine-tuning of its definition; it would also 
require a paradigm shift. 
The second challenge of bioethics is a complex one. It involves the transition from the 
atomistic individualism of traditional ethical approaches to a more relational and com-
munity-oriented account of the good. This transition, however, cannot dispense with 
our core values, which are a legacy of individualism (e.g. human rights in all its varieties 
and the liberal principles of justice). This challenge becomes even more daunting when 
we realize that it also involves the rethinking of what human communities really are and 
what kind of relations do they maintain with non-human animals.
Human communities are much more than a mere group of individuals belonging to the 
same species (and of course, much more than a set of different ethnic, social or cultural 
groups). They are heterogeneous communities, but highly structured and organized in 
their social, political and economic levels. In democratic liberal societies, their unity and 
cohesion is determined by a collective project aimed at achieving the common good. 
5 The transition from ethics to politics is particularly noticeable in environmental ethics. This process had already appeared as a 
theoretical interest in the late 70’s, but It became a practical concern in the 90’s (Dobson, 1990; Taylor, 1991) and reached its current 
maturity in the early years of the 21st century (Meyer, 2006).
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At the same time, they are organized under a legal framework based on principles of 
justice, whose aim is to ensure that the fundamental values necessary for a peaceful 
coexistence are respected.6 
In these communities, humans also coexist with other social animals. Some of them 
live, work and flourish with us; others are used for research, food, as entertainment or 
as economic resources. In addition to sentience and awareness, many of them are also 
able to understand the social and emotional interactions that determine their member-
ship in a group. They are able to recognize and follow rules, to interpret our feelings and 
moods, and they are able to do that, not only with humans, but also with other animals. 
(Bekoff & Pierce, 2009). Those characteristics, combined with the social, economic and 
familiar relations that many of them maintain with humans lead us to the realization 
that non-human animals are an integral part of our society, without which human com-
munities could not exist. They are already part of the common good. It is within this 
context that we can talk about the relations between human communities and non-
human animals. 
4. Afterthoughts and recommendations 
 One of the greatest challenges for bioethics in the coming decades will be the transi-
tion from a paradigm centered solely on the individual (or, even more narrowly, in the 
human person) to one that also takes into account the relations between individuals of 
different species who belong to the same community. This is imperative for the integra-
tion of animal ethics within its realm, but also essential for the field of bioethics. Topics 
on public health ethics, social and global justice are already hav-
ing an indelible effect on the field. In order to confront the com-
plex problems that arise from these areas, bioethics will have 
to take into account the relations that a community maintains 
with its members and with other communities (be they human 
or animal communities). In order to achieve that, it will need the 
development of a new theoretical framework based on relations 
between communities of individuals. 
As a tool for analysis, this framework will have to be able to 
highlight the ethical and political dimensions that arise from the 
interactions between human communities, non-human animals 
and the ecosystem. I have proposed a framework of such char-
acteristics elsewhere (Tirado, 2016), although there are other 
specific proposals addressing various political aspects of the 
human-animal relation. (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011; Garner, 2013; Smith, 2012) 
If the “human-animal” dichotomy has to make any sense, it has to come from the rec-
ognition that our humanity is part of our animality. This, far from having a pejorative 
6 Some may think that these refer only to the values of classical liberalism (e.g. liberty, equality, autonomy, property, etc.) but they em-
body other values as well (e.g. solidarity, social justice, pluralism, toleration, etc.)
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connotation, makes humanity a humbler, yet deeper notion. It is not about embracing 
our aggression, violence and selfishness; such qualities are not desirable in any social 
community. What this new notion of humanity tells us is that we share with other ani-
mals many other aspects in common that characterize us and that we delight in calling 
human. Vulnerability, solidarity, love, empathy and cooperation are also characteristics 
that many non-human animals that live in our communities share with us. Therefore, 
when we think about the common good we aspire as a society, this should also be 
extended to other beings that are part of our communities and have gone through a 
process of socialization that enables them to be members of them, even if they belong 
to other species.
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